Yoga Sutra 3.13 transformations of dharma time-phase

Sūtra III.13

By (analogy with) that, are explained the transformations of dharma, time-phase, and basis (avasthā) in the elements and in the senses

By (analogy with) that are explained the transformations of dharma, time-phase, and basis, in the elements and in the senses. That just described mental transformation – of what kind? – in the form of dharma, time-phase, and basis in the form of dharma, in the form of time-phase, and in the form of basis, in the elements and in the senses in physical elements like the earth and in the senses such as hearing where there is no change into a different principle (tattva). Change once recognized in the unsteadiness of mind, the extension is made to change in the elements and senses; difficult though it is to apprehend, it can be seen to be like the transformations of the mind in the three states of the yogin.

(Opponent) But the mental transformations that have just been described were: inhibition, samādhi, and one-pointedness, and not change of dharma, time-phase, or basis. So how can there be any extension?

(Answer) He shows how the latter have been covered too:

The repression and manifestation in the dharmin the mind of the extraversion-inhibition pair of dharma-s is a change of dharma.

By referring to this difference between dharma-s, we have spoken of dharma-difference, and by referring to the repression and manifestation of the two dharma-s, extraversion and inhibition, we have assuredly spoken of changes of time-phase and basis.

How so? When from the present time-phase a dharma is changed to the time-phase of the past, it is repressed, and one which from the future phase is changed to the present phase, becomes manifest. From that reference to repression and manifestation, the slight change of basis at every instant has been indicated. As he says: the three phases of inhibition are a time-phase transformation, corresponding to presented along with the three periods past, future and present. Something that changes must inevitably have the three periods one after another. But an immutable in which they do not exist is called unchanging (kūṭastha).

This inhibition putting aside the period of the future time-phase, comes to the present without leaving its dharma-hood of inhibition, since no effect can originate which is not already existent. For if non-existent effects did originate, one thing would not have the three times, since there would be no three phases as determined by the three times. So he says: Without ever going away from its dharma-hood it comes to the present time-phase, where in which present phase it is manifest as what it really is. This period is the second period of inhibition – second in relation to the period of the future.

But when extraversion arises in the time-phase of the present, inhibition then enters its third period, the phase of the past, and this it is which comes to be its third period.

(Opponent) If this is so, then while it is still in the time-phase of the present, there is not a triple time-period of inhibition.

(Answer) To this he says: It is not separated from the time-phases of past and future. Why not? Because it is this which is future, present and past.

In the same way, extraversion has three time-phases, as conjoined with the three periods past, future and present; putting aside the period of the time-phase of the present, without leaving its dharma-hood, as was explained in the case of inhibition, when the dharma of the inhibitor was changing to the present period, comes to the time-phase the period of the past. This is the second period for it, for extraversion, taking the present as the first period. But in relation to the second, the third time-period itself will become second. And it is not separated from the future and present time-phases.

Again, extraversion, having put aside the time-phase of the future in which it was held by reason of a saṃskāra of inhibition, comes to the time-phase of the present, without leaving its dharma-hood. And now, it functions in manifestation as its own true nature in its proper operative or preventive capacities. This is its second period in relation to the future, and it is not separated from the past and future time-phases.

In this way the mind is disjointed from the dharma-pain of extraversion and inhibition. Thus now there is inhibition, and now there is extraversion. This is the change of time-phase of the mental dharma-s, extraversion and inhibition.

Similarly the change in saṃskāra-basis is described. What is it then? At moments of inhibition when inhibition is in the present phase the saṃskāra-s of inhibition become powerful, by the fact of its saṃskāra-s being powerful, inhibition itself dominates, and the saṃskāra-s of extraversion are weakened, with corresponding weakness of extraversion. Similarly, at the time of extraversion there is relative superiority of the extravertive saṃskāra-s and weakening of the inhibitive saṃskāra-s. Such is the change of the saṃskāra-basis of the dharma-s, which latter are conjoined from moment to moment with the strength, and corresponding weakness on the other side, of the basic saṃskāra-s.

He now shows which sort of change applies to which: There is change for the dharmin (possessor) in his dharma-s, as for example for the mind, their possessor, in its dharma-s like inhibition and extraversion; (change) for dharma-s in the time-phases of the three periods, as for mental dharma-s like inhibition in the phases of future, etc., and change for the time-phases in the saṃskāra-basis, as for the time-phases like the present in the strength and weakening of the saṃskāra basis.

Thus it is that the operation of the guṇa-s is never without never free from changes of dharma, time-phase, and saṃskāra-basis.

The operation of the guṇa-s fluctuates, and on that very point it is said that the essence of the guṇa-s sattva and the other two is to cause activity, being altogether causes impelling towards some operation. On these lines has to be understood in the light of the three-fold change in dharma, in time-phase, and in saṃskāra-basis which has been demonstrated, the three-fold change in elements and in the senses, arising from making a distinction between dharma and dharmin.

Ultimately however change is only one. How so? Because dharma is simply the nature of its dharmin (possessor), for dharma has no separate existence in the absence of the dharmin, nor can there be any separate time-phase if dharma is excluded, nor can there be any separate existence of saṃskāra-basis without time-phase.

So it is merely the change of the dharmin that evolves by way of dharma-s by way of the triple distinction in dharma.

(Opponent) What then is the change of the dharmin? Is it not origination and destruction of what is absolutely non-existent previously?

(Answer) To this he says: In this case, a dharma for instance a jar at present in the dharmin namely the clay has a different state in the time-periods of past, future and present, there being difference in the notion of it: ‘The jar is past, is present, is in the future’ – (ideas) conceived of the jar which is present in the dharmin. The difference is simply between the dharma-s being manifest or being concealed. It is not that there is difference in the material substance, it is simply the clay material, another form of the dharmin.

Now he explains with an example: As when a vessel of gold is broken up and is made into a different form such as a bracelet its state is different, the difference being in the form of a svastika or a bracelet and so on, but it is not that there is any difference in the material of the gold.

An objector who professes the doctrine of origination from non-existence (asat-kārya-samārambhābhimānī) says: ‘Your (supposed) dharmin is to be superior to dharma-s but it will be in fact a collection of dharma-s not yet existent, coming together one after another. There is no one dharmin persisting through the dharma-s past, future and present, yet apart from them. (But if there were) any persisting entity (which would in fact have to be) not superior to dharma-s, not apart from dharma-s, never changing from what it was previously with each successive change of the nature of the material, still it will have followed conformed to (at any rate) the difference of state between earlier and later, between the states of past, etc., and that would involve this contradiction: This dharmin which you postulate would, in spite of its “immutability” have been changing – in its supposed unchangingness, it would yet be changing.’

(Answer) This is no fallacy. Why not? Because we do not take an absolute position, we do not take the position that the dharmin is absolutely unchanging, nor that it perishes absolutely. If the dharmin were absolutely unchanging, like the Self (ātman), then there would result the fallacy of unchangeability, because the dharma-s are not different from our dharmin. But we do not accept absolute unchangeability of the guṇa-s, which are the dharmin-s, for he is going to speak of the perpetual changeability of the guṇa-s.

Or again, we do not take a position of absolute difference or absolute non-difference as regards the dharma and dharmin. If there is absolute non-difference of the dharma-s from the persisting dharmin-s, it will result in unchangeability, whereas if it is absolute difference of the dharma-s, it would entail their absolute destruction. But neither absolute difference nor absolute non-difference is accepted by us, so there is no fallacy of unchangeability.

(Opponent) How is it that there is not unchangeability?

(Answer) To this he says: Every thing in the three worlds passes away from its (state of) manifestation, and so there is no unchangeability. Why not? Because this denies permanence. From the very fact that effects exist, permanence is denied.

(Opponent) Then the things are absolutely destroyed.

(Answer) To this he says: Though it has passed away, its destruction is denied, for the cause persists, and as the effect is no different from the cause, absolute destruction is certainly refuted. Now here it is said by some people:

(Opponent) This is a case of the fallacy of self-contradiction. How so? The modification passes away out of manifestation, for its permanence is denied; yet though it has passed away, it still exists, for its destruction is denied. So a reason has been given ‘because permanence is denied’ which is contradicted by the conclusion ‘though passed away, the modification still exists’.

How can this be? Manifestation is coming to be what a thing is (ātma-lābha); passing (apāya) is its disappearance (pracyuti). If a modification, destroyed from being-what-it-is (ātma-lābha), (yet still) exists, it cannot be denied that it is permanent. Existence of the modification even when passed away out of manifestation has to be called permanence (on this showing).

What denies permanence is the disappearance of the modification from being-what-it-is; what disappears from being-what-it-is is impermanent; what exists does not disappear from being-what-it-is. Existence, and disappearance of being-what-it-is are two opposing qualities (dharma), and these two can not coexist. This reason, which having settled for a final conclusion goes on to negate that very same thing is what is termed a self-contradictory reason(ing).

(Answer) Our position has no such defect. As when something like a jar, though present, is not perceived (because it is) in an inner apartment, but cannot thereby be stated not to exist, inasmuch as it is made manifest by means of a light, so this triple world, coming together as causal relationship, is present but not clearly manifest, because it consists essentially of guṇa-s, but is made manifest by the impelling cause of the purposes of Puruṣa.

So it is that motion, on the destruction of its own saṃskāra and manifestation of the saṃskāra of stasis, according to causal association, goes out of manifestation. As when the light of a lamp is covered up, a jar and so on, though present, go out of manifestation because of the obscuring darkness, so here too the Great principle and the other qualities undergo creation and dissolution in the three time-periods, but not so sattva and the other two guṇa-s which possess those dharma-s.

So it is that the ultimate support of the Great principle and the rest, by sattva and the other two guṇa-s, does not have the quality of manifesting as a qualified thing (dharma-bhūta), but being a mass of altogether latent (niruddha) subtle dharma-s, is not perceived in the form of manifestation of physical dharma-s. Thus it was said: Everything in the three worlds passes out of manifestation, not that it passes away from the nature of the dharmin. And because it is permanent in its nature of dharmin, it is further said: Though it has passed away, it exists.

Thus there is a single dharmin of manifest form and also of potential form. As manifest it is transient, and as potential it is permanent, so how is there any contradiction? Devadatta, who is always seen going about in the course of his business, will not cease to be when his activity ceases: it is only the activity that has disappeared. So it is that the dharmin exists in the unmanifest state, as it is also observed in the state of manifestation; (when unmanifest) it is like a jar left in complete darkness.

Even the manifest thing is a dharmin in regard to its own various dharma-s; as dharmin it is taken as permanent, and as dharma-s it is transient. So among modifications (of prakṛti) there is no hard-and-fast distinction of dharma and dharmin, and it is quite acceptable that it should be inconclusive.

This does not contradict what was said: it passes out of manifestation: a reason was given, because permanence is denied. Nor is there contradiction in the words though passed away, it exists. The two statements refer to two different things. Nor does because destruction is denied conflict with though passed away, it exists. For Devadatta, though passed away from out-of-doors, still exists.

Now you might think: exists expresses permanence; then the assertion of permanence involves a contradiction with because permanence is denied. It is not so, because we do not accept the premise. We do not maintain permanence of manifestation, and this is the permanence that is being denied. We maintain that there are dharma-s both of potentiality and of manifestation, and that is how it is to be explained.

For one who does not see this, a further example may be given to remove the sense of a contradiction: the case of the blind man’s mirror. It is like some blind man who, not realizing his own inability to see, procures a mirror for his own use.

Again, if you try to establish one side by saying that there is an illusory projection (adhyāropa) of permanence and transience, or manifestation and potentiality, on to the one locus, that cannot be a contradiction either, because it does not bring about a conflict (viparita). Why not? It was said Though passed away, it exists … because permanence is denied. To say because permanence is denied comes down to saying because of impermanence; yet the existence of what has passed away asserts its permanence. The opposite of permanence is impermanence. But impermanence of one element is no reason for an impermanence (of the other, an assertion) which would contradict its permanence, and so bring about a conflict. For as it cannot in fact produce that undesirable conflict, it should not lead us to a contradiction.

You may insist that what has been termed denial of permanence should rather be called cessation from being-what-it-is (ātma-lābhāt pracyuti). Even so, this is simply a verbal difference, not a difference in meaning. Cessation from being-what-it-is, and impermanence, mean the same thing.

Then you may prefer the words ‘because there is no possibility of permanence’; but in fact our phrase ‘because permanence is denied’ does express the meaning ‘because there is no possibility of permanence’.

You may argue that this explanation of the meaning has been arbitrarily attributed (āropya), but to this we reply that the facts of permanence or impermanence are not maintained (absolutely) in the face of the difference between potential and manifest, and between dharma and dharmin.

By this reasoning we refute the charge of contradiction in the words: Though it has passed away, it exists, for its destruction is denied.

(Opponent) But how, on your theory, can you maintain the existence of something which, having passed out of manifestation, is not now being directly cognized (by the senses)? Inasmuch as it is not perceived, it does not exist, any more than a flower in the sky.

(Answer) The answer is, that non-cognizance (through the senses: anupalabdhi) is not conclusive, for there is cognizance by inference and by authority. What has manifested must have existed before it appeared, and out of that (pre-existence) it appeared. If it were non-existent it would never appear, any more than the horn of a hare. To allow existence of the non-existent, and non-existence of the existent, would mean that one could have no confidence in anything. Further, if non-existence is assumed from non-cognition, then the causes and accessories leading to the release of Selves could not exist or arise before they were cognized: so how could any of them ever be attained?

‘Of the non-existent (a-sat) there is no coming-to-be (bhāva); there is no not-coming-to-be of the existent,’ says the holy text (āgama: Gītā II.16). Non-cognizance by the senses is no sufficient reason for (postulating) non-existence.

(Opponent) Well then, if the modification of the manifestation does exist, why is it not cognized?

(Answer) Though in the field of direct sense-perception, when it merges into its cause, it becomes subtle, and for that reason is not directly cognized’, the non-cognition is not because it is non-existent.

Now he goes on to speak of the change of time-phase of the objects and senses. A dharma has changes of time-phase, present and past, in the three time-periods, as a dharma is clay-lump, jar and so on, in the time-periods of the past and others. What is being said here?

Conjoined to the past time-phase, not that it has become non-existent. And not disjoined from future and present, the two other phases. The cause, the clay, is present, and even when the jar, etc. which are implicit in it are not perceivable, still the jar is thereby conjoined to the present time-phase. In the same way, the jar-which-is-to-be is the future of that clay, and in that sense we say ‘It will be’ – it is not disjoined from the future time-phase. So what is present now is conjoined to the present time-phase, but not disjoined from the past and future ones, and what is future being joined to future time-phase, is not disjoined from those of the present and past. A jar, being essentially clay in the past and future, is not disjoined from the other time-phases by the fact of its being clearly seen now.

(Opponent) How can a dharma conjoined to one time-phase not be disjoined from the other two?

(Answer) He gives a parallel instance of (being conjoined to one and yet) not being disjoined (from others): as a man, though captivated by one woman, is not unattracted by others. The passion for the others, however, is conjoined to the past and future times. It has been shown that this is because there is no destruction of the existent and no coming into being of the non-existent.

Here a difficulty is brought forward by others:

(Opponent) In the change of time-phase, everything every dharma is conjoined to all the phases, so there must be confusion of the time-periods. How so? Because (on your theory) what is to be, is present now, and also past. There would be presence and futurity in the past, and pastness and futurity in what is present, and pastness and presence in what is future. Thus the time-periods would be mutually confused.

(Answer) This is the refutation, namely: In the case of the dharma-s, the fact of their being so does not have to be proved. In the case of a dharmin, say clay, its dharma-s – being a lump, being a jar, or being a dish – do not have to be proved to be so, namely different from other dharma-s, and in the being-so of the dharma-s, the difference of time-phase is also predicated. In the dharma-s being so and not otherwise, the difference of time-phase is also predicated as a fact.

How is this? For instance, when there is the stage of the clay lump, the jar conjoined to the future time is not present, nor is it past; and yet looked at as future clay-ness, it is not disjoined from the past and present.

So when conjoined to the present, it is not past nor yet future; and yet seen as a form of the dharmin, it is not disjoined from the past time-phase when it ceased to be, and from the future one where it comes into being.

Again, the past is conjoined to the past time and is not present nor future; and yet from the point of view of the manifestation of its clayness in direct experience, it is not unconnected with present and future.

It should be considered in its relationship with lumps and dishes and so on, and therefore he says: The present situation is not the only one, not the only time-phase of the dharma, for it has the three times, as has been explained. Thus the time-periods are not confused with each other.

For then (if the objection were valid) this mind should never have the dharma of sexual passion) the mind would be a dharmin free from passion, and no dharma of passion and the like, and the difference between them, could be established in it. The time-periods would be confused with each other. Why? because at the time of anger, sexual passion is not presenting itself

For at the time of anger, sexual passion does not present itself as if that were its own time, because at the time of anger, the passion is either past or future. So it is with anger at the time of passion. For if there were only the one time-phase – the present situation, in fact – then even at a time of anger, the sexual passion might present itself, or might not present itself, or else perhaps would never fail to be there even at any time of anger.

Moreover it is not possible for the three time-phases to be present at the same time in a single development of time, because of the contradiction (between them), what would be possible is a sequence a temporal sequence of the individual time-phases each manifesting according to its particular causes, the particular causes which bring about the jar, etc.

And it is said: ‘The powers of present form and the powers of development are in conflict.’ In the jar conjoined to the powers that have developed the present form, the powers which would develop the forms of lump and so on do not prevail because of the conflict between them; and so it is that the past and future forms, which are not in conflict since they conform equally to the dharmin, being the common elements (in the dharmin), co-operate with the dominating powers.

Therefore there is no confusion of the time-periods. For When, for instance, sexual passion presents itself in relation to one person, it is not then non-existent in regard to other women. What is it then? It is simply that it is continued in the common basis in the form of the mind, past or even in the future; in this sense it is existent at that time for that object. The time-phase is explained on these lines.

(Opponent) There is this doubt. The lump and the dish are past or future, and therefore do not exist in the jar state. They are in fact the past and future states of the dharmin called clay, and it is not a question of time-periods of lump and dish and so on.

(Answer) The reply is: It is not the dharmin that has the three time-periods, but the dharma-s that have them. The dharmin called clay is not past or future by the pastness or futurity of the lump or dish. For in all these dharma-s, it conforms to what we recognize as clay. What then? It is the dharma-s, the clay-lump and so on, which have the three time-periods, as at the time of the pot we do not see the lump or the dish. So it is unquestionable that it is the dharma-s that have the conjunction with the three time-periods.

They the dharma-s defined by the time-phase, the clay lump and the others being marked out as being in one of the three time-periods are coming to particular states of strength or weakness, etc., and they are referred to as something different, as when a new pot has become old, because the thing is now in another state, not that it is another substance apart from the clay.

It is like the single stroke, which in the hundreds place namely the third place, the first two (units and tens) being vacant, is 100; in the tens place is 10, being in the second place with the units column empty; and that same stroke in the units place is 1. Again, it is like the very same woman’s being called mother and also daughter and sister, from another point of view.

This is all simply difference of verbal notions arising from difference of state, but not from difference of dharma or of dharmin. And thereby, what is said by others to the effect that difference of verbal notion, time-phase, dharma, time and so on, is the cause of difference of effect and cause is shown to be fallacious.

As to the third change, change of state, it is said by some that this involves the defect of entailing immutability (kauṭasthya). What is this corollary of immutability?

(Opponent) The time-periods the present and the other two are determined by the functioning of the thing itself In what way? When a dharma a pot in the state of the lump is not functioning as itself then it is future. When it does so function then it is present. When it has done so and has ceased, then it is past. Here it is only the fact that the dharma has attained, or is now attaining, or will attain in the future, its innate functioning, becoming the dharmin as it really is, that establishes it in a state. And therefore, as the dharmin-s the guṇa-s are permanent because they can never be impermanent, there will result immutability of dharma-s, time-phase, and state. This is the defect now put forward.

(Answer) There is no such defect. Why not? Because even though a possessor of attributes may be permanent, there is variety from the clash between the attributes themselves. Because of the variety of (degrees of) dominance or subjection among them, absolute immutability like the Puruṣa cannot be conceded to the guṇa-s. For the fact of change is generally accepted. Though they are ceaselessly changing, still no amount of mutual clashing leads to their becoming something else: so there is no immutability.

What is this variety of clashing? He says: As any aggregate like the body with a beginning having a cause being purely a dharma not other than the nature of that cause perishes, that dharma disappearing with the rise of another. Of what is the aggregate? He explains: of imperishables like sound. So the liṅga known as the Great principle, with a beginning having a cause being purely a dharma, perishes having become the nature of the imperishable guṇa-s. This is the technical meaning of change (vikāra), as being merely change of the dharma of the Great principle and the rest, and not of the guṇa-s. There is no destruction of the guṇa-s by their clashing variously: the guṇa-s are eternal by nature.

These changes of dharma, time-phase, and condition, do not overstep the bounds of the nature of the dharmin. The change is only one, which flows forth in all these particular ways: because change is disappearance of a preceding dharma, and rise of another dharma, in an enduring substance.

As an illustration of it: clay is a dharmin. Entering another form (a jar) from the lump form, it changes from that lump dharma. (The jar form, having quitted the time-phase of futurity, now enters the present phase, and thus changes in the temporal sense – omitted in the Vivaraṇa: Tr.)

Then, the jar is every instant experiencing (change in) newness and age, and thus undergoes change of condition (avasthā). Condition is another dharma such as a lump form of the dharmin itself such as clay in the sense that the dharmin comes to the condition of lump, dish, and other forms. Of the dharma also, the jar and so on, the condition is another time-phase such as the past. For it is that very jar, the dharma, which meets with the past, future, or present condition.

So Change is only one … though analysed variously. The analysis should be applied to other things too, to things other than the clay example – for instance, to body and senses.

These changes of dharma, time-phase and condition do not overstep the bounds of the nature of the dharmin. The change of the dharmin is only one, which flows forth in all these particular ways, namely change of dharma, time-phase, and condition. How is this? because change is disappearance of a preceding dharma, and rise of another dharma, in an enduring substance, and it is in this sense that the dharmin can be said to have change.